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IN THE SUPRE1\1E COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

T. FRANK SEVY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case

UTAH STATE FARM BUREAU
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. 8952

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This appeal is taken from a Judgment entered in favor
of the plaintiff in the sum of $1446.92 with interest thereon
from March 31, 1956 entered by the Honorable John C. Sevy,
Jr., on April 25, 1958 in the Sixth Judicial District of the State
of Utah in and for Garfield County.
3
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about March 25th or 26th of 1956, the plaintiff
in this action, Mr. T. Frank Sevy, was delivered a 1955 Pontiac
by one George Talbot, who was the sales representative of
Pearson & Crofts, an automobile dealership in Richfield, Utah
and Panguitch, Utah. The testimony is that Mr. T. Frank Sevy
resides in Panguitch and that he had two automobiles, one
being a 1949 Pontiac and the other a 1951 Chevrolet Pick up.
It further appears that on or about March 27, 1956, one Von
Davis, a representative of Pearson and Crofts, together with
George Talbot, called at the residence of the plaintiff and
negotiated for the purchase of a 1955 Pontiac automobile. It
further appears that on this occasion certain documents were
signed and later endorsed by the parties and sale of the automobile was consummated at that time.
Mr. Sevy carried his insurance with the defendant company and appellant herein and his testimony is that he informed Von Davis and George Talbot that he wanted to keep
his insurance with the Farm Bureau Insurance Company.
Shortly thereafter the testimony is that there was a discussion as to the paint on the 1955 Pontiac automobile and
also the seat covers and it was agreed by and between the
parties that the Pearson and Crofts Company would paint the
automobile and also replace the seat covers and clean the car
as agreed between the parties. It further appears that on that
occasion that Von Davis was then given the 1955 Pontiac automobile to drive to Richfield for the purpose of installing the
seat covers and taking care of the paint job as agreed. While
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en route to Richfield, Utah, the auomobile was wrecked and
this action brought after said accident.
The testimony is also to the effect that the plaintiff informed Mr. James Yardly, the representative for the appellant
in the Panguitch area, that he had purchased another car and
wanted his insurance transferred to the other car on the evening of March 2 7.
Subsequent to the 195 5 automobile being wrecked it appears further that another 1955 Pontiac was sold to the plaintiff
shortly after the automobile was wrecked.

STATEMENT OF POINT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED IS INSUFFICIENT
TO PROVE THE ALLEGED DAMAGE TO THE AUTOMOBILE OF THE PLAINTIFF.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED IS INSUFFICIENT
TO PROVE THE ALLEGED DAMAGE TO THE AUTOMOBILE OF THE PLAINTIFF.
The burden of proof that is placed on the plaintiff suing
for damages to a motor vehicle using the cost of repairs is as
follows:
1. The necessity for repairs as a result of the injury.

5
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2. That the repairs made were reasonably proper to be
made; and
3. That the cost thereof was reasonable.
This character of proof should fully develop the pertinent
facts. 5a Am. Jur., Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Sec.
1114, p. 950; also see City of Oklahoma City vs. Wilcoxson,
48 P. (2d) 1039, 1043 (1935).
In conjunction with the above stated rule as to damages
see the annotation of cases in 169 A.L.R. pp 1107-1111. On
page 1111, we find the following:
"COST OF REPAIR AS ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF
DAMAGE.
The use of the cost of repairs as the measure of damage
is often expressly recognized as an alternative to the right
to recover the difference is the reasonable market value of the
car before and after the accident.
Thus, in Parilli v. Brooklyn City R. Co. (1932) 236 App.
Div. 577, 260 NYS 60, the court said: "There are alternative
methods of making punitive damages sustained where personal property has been injured. The proper and simple method
is to prove the amount of lessened market value or the
difference in the value of the property immediately preceding
and following the wrong ... An alternative method is a proof
of repair value of the necessary repairs made to restore it as
nearly as possible to its original condition." The court continues: ''Of course, there must be pt·oof that the t·epairs were
necessary and wet"e reasonable worth the sum paid, for without it neither the t'alue of the repairs tZor the extent of the

6
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injury is thereby established . . . It is not sufficient to make
proof of the amount paid.n (Italics ours.)
These then being the essential elements of proof required
of the plaintiff, the next question, of course, is whether or
not the evidence adduced was sufficient to prove the damages
claimed.
In the instant case there is only one witness who made
any remarks about damages or the amount thereof. That was
Mr. Von Davis. The plaintiff failed to introduce any documentary evidence as to how much specific damage was done
to the car; whether the injury complained of was entirely
caused by the accident, or that the repairs were reasonable.
The testimony was further that Pearson and Crofts was the
only place an estimate was obtained and, as claimed by the
defendant, were, in fact, the owners of the car pursuant to
the later transactions of the plaintiff on the purchase of another 1955 Pontiac automobile. Hence, it is perfectly obvious
that Pearson and Crofts could have placed the estimate at any
figure they so desired.
In any event the plaintiff failed to show by any evidence,
documentary or otherwise, that the repairs were reasonable
and that they were reasonably proper to be made.
What capacity does Von Davis have with Pearson &
Croft? Mr. Davis (R. 45) testified that he is the sales manager
for Pearson & Croft and that he was with George Talbot,
a salesman for Pearson & Croft in Panguitch, Utah, when the
plaintiff purchased the 1955 automobile that was wrecked. He
does not testify that he is a mechanic; that he himself ap7
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praised the damaged car; that he knew it to be reasonable, or
that he had any knowledge about the amount of the bill except
that an appraisal was made by someone. He was allowed to
testify as to the amount arrived at by a third person. In fact,
it was complete hearsay on the part of the witness Von Davis,
that an appraisal was prepared and that he knew anything
it (R. 59). The record further discloses that all of his testimony was objected to by counsel for the appellant as not having
a proper foundation and certainly that it was hearsay.
We find on page 58-59 of the transcript as follows:

"Q. Now, in regard to the damage to the 1955 Pontiac,
you testified that after it was damaged it was taken
to Pearson & Crofts; is that correct?
A. Yes.

Q. Was there any appraisement made of those damages?
A. Yes, a repair . . .
BY MR. CHARLIER: Just answer yes or no.
A. Yes.
Q. Yes, there was an appraisal is your testimony?
A. Yes.

Q. And after that appraisement was made of the damages, what was done with it?
A. The car was stored.

Q. I mean, what was done with the appraisal?
A. The appraisal was sent to the Farm Bureau Insurance Company in Salt Lake City.
Q. And did you send the appraisal to the Farm Bureau
Insurance Company?
8
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A. Yes.

Q. And what was the total amount of that appraisal?
BY MR. CHARLIER: We will object to that, Your
Honor.

A. $1446.
BY MR. CHARLIER: Just a minute.
BY THE COURT: What's that?
BY MR. OLSEN: The total amount of the appraisal
sent by him to their company.
BY MR. CHARLIER: We object, there's no foundation.
BY THE COURT: Objection overruled if he knows.

A. $1446.92.
Q. Could you tell the Court where that appraisal was
prepared?
A. The appraisal was prepared in our garage by our
mechanic and itemized-each operation was itemized.
Q. Now, would you explain to the Court a little further how these appraisals were worked out, how
you itemized those things, in what manner?
A. All operation changes, as replace the right door,
glass replacing, the right rear fender, replace the
radiator, all operations are itemized and if the part
is replaced, the cost of replacement, the cost of the
new part, the new part is put on the estimate and,
also, the labor if a damaged part is to be repaired,
the amount of repair is put on. Each operation that
it takes to repair the automobile."
Von Davis, himself, did not make the estimate and certainly the court erred in allowing him to testify as to the repair
9
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because a proper foundation was not laid and it was complete
hearsay on his part. It was certainly not within the witness's
own knowledge as to the reasonableness of the repairs or
whether or not they were necessary and properly a consequence of this particular accident and certainly such evidence
should not be admitted. He failed to testify about the particular
damage to this car and speaks in generalities.
The law is clear that a witness must be properly qualified
as an expert in order to be competent to testify as to the reasonable value of repairs or their costs.
Bailey vs. Ford, 145 A. 85, 127 S.E. 821 ( 1927).
Moore vs. Levy, 128 Cal. App. 687, 18 P. 2d 362 ( 1933).
We further find in the case of Spaulding Manufacturing
Company vs. Holliday, 32 Okla. 823, 124 P. 35, 36 (1912):
"Matters capable of proof should not be left to conjecture. Verdict should be based upon evidence, but
not upon guess work, especially concerning things so
easily capable of proof."
It has been held in many cases and also found in Vol. 6 of
Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice in
Section 3430 as follows:

"Testimony as to the value of repairs by the witness
when he did not testify to the necessity of the repairs
covered by the estimate, nor to the accuracy of his
estimated value, is mere hearsay."
Clearly this is exactly what happened in this case and Mr.
Von Davis at no time was qualified to testify as to the value
of the repairs; that the repairs were made necessary as a result
of the accident; nor that the value of the repairs was reason10
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able. Hence, it follows that they were merely statements that
are hearsay on the part of the witness and the plaintiff has
clearly failed to establish any damages in this case.
Also see Edwards vs. Maryland Motor Car Insurance
Company, 197 N.Y.S. 460, 204 App. Div. 174 (1922).
The purported bill that Mr. Von Davis referred to while
on the stand, but was never introduced into evidence, during
the entirety of his testimony being objected to by counsel for
the appellant, necessarily follows that no damages were sufficient! y proven by the plaintiff. Based on such evidence if the
court were to allow the testimony of Von Davis as to the
appraisal of the repairs of this car to stand with nothing else,
it would indeed be a dangerous practice. The law certainly
tequires more evidence as to the exact damages incurred in
this matter and certainly they were easily obtainable from
the Pearson & Crofts Dealership, but the record is completely
devoid of any documentary proof which would sustain the
damages in this action. Clearly the law requires absolute
certainty of observation or statements by a witness giving an
opinion. See 20 Am. Jur., Section 768.
It has been held on many occasions that a mere general
statement that is vague and indefinite will not justify a verdict
for damages. See Smith vs. Calley et al., 284 P. 974 (1930).
In the Smith case it is held that damages must be proven and
if they are not proven then of course the trial court has no way
to measure the damages and as such damages will not be
awarded to the plaintiff and they would be entitled to nominal
damages only.
The same reasoning is found in the case of Moore vs. Levy,
11
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supra, wherein we find the following quotation from Corpus
Juris and found on page 365 of said case to be as follows:
"Competent evidence of the cost of repairs may be
admitted, and one who is qualified from his proved
experience to be a judge of the amount ordinarily
charged at the usual and market rates for thework and
material necessary to repair a motor vehicle, and who
supervised the making of repairs upon the vehicle in
question is a competent witness as to the reasonable
cost thereof, evidence of the amount expended for
repairs is admissible only as it may bear upon the reasonable cost of those reasonably proper and necessary,
but the actual cost of repairs may be shown in connection with evidence that such cost was reasonable,
and a bill for repairs may be admitted to prove the
reasonable cost, when there is testimony to the effect
that the items contained therein are correct and that
the charges therefore are all just and proper, but not
in the absence thereof. If a repair bill merely identified
by the management of a shop who made the repairs
who did not supervise them, or have any personal
knowledge thereof, is not admissible. It is error to admit testimony to the cost of repairs other than those
shown to be due to the injuries complained of." 42
Corpus Juris Section 1297.
Clearly this is the standard that the law requires in order
for a plaintiff to set forth the damages he has received as a
result of an accident. It is obvious from the testimony in this
case that the plaintiff has failed to meet this burden and the
witness Von Davis has no reasonable way to ascertain the
damage caused to the 1955 Pontiac that was sold to T. Frank
Sevy. It necessarily follows that since he cannot testify as to
these elements the court had insufficient evidence before it
to award damages to the plaintiff.
12
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The court does not have any standard whatsoever by
which to base the damages involved in this case and as such
the court should, based on the evidence, enter only an award
of nominal damages against this defendant.
It has been stated in Moore vs. Daggett, 150 A. 538, 129
Me. 162 (1930), that in event there is no evidence on which
to base damages properly, only nominal damages can be re-

covered.
It necessarily follows from the above stated cases and
the evidence in this case that the court erred in not granting
defendant motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint (R. 94)
due to the fact that the plaintiff has utterly failed to prove
any damages. Counsel for the defendant made a proper motion
at that time, but the court denied said motion.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted to this Honorable Court that
for the above stated and foregoing reasons that the trial court
erred in granting the plaintiff damages based on the evidence
before the court and as such the judgment should be reversed
and an entry for nominal damages only be entered.

Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHARLIER
Tel Charlier

Attorneys for Defendant

13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

